Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
All Decisions

Housing Court Decisions Project

2021-06-10

Karpen v. Castro

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/housing_court_all

Recommended Citation
"Karpen v. Castro" (2021). All Decisions. 289.
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/housing_court_all/289

This Housing Court Decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Housing Court Decisions Project at
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Decisions by
an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information,
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

INDEX
FILED: KINGS CIVIL COURT - L&T 06/11/2021 10:05 AM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 32

NO. LT-087288-17/KI [HO]

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/11/2021

CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF KINGS: HOUSING PART G
-------------------------------------------------------------X
SHLOMO KARPEN,

Index No. 87287/17
87288/17
87730/18

Petitioner,
-against-

DECISION/ORDER

MANUEL CASTRO and MIRIAM ANDRADE,
Respondents.
-------------------------------------------------------------X
SHLOMO KARPEN,
Petitioner,
-against-

JUAN PABLO AREVALO and GUADALUPE
ROMERO,
Respondents.
-------------------------------------------------------------X
SHLOMO KARPEN,
Petitioner,
-against-

JULIO ANDRADE,
Respondent.
--------------------------------------------------------------X

KEVIN C. McCLANAHAN, J.H.C.:

Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of this
motion: for leave to renew.
Papers

Numbered

Notice of motion and Affidavits Annexed...................................
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Upon the foregoing cited papers, the decision/order on this motion is as follows:
In its prior Decision/Order dated November 20, 2019, this Court dismissed the instant
personal use proceedings based on the newly enacted Housing Stability and Tenant Protection
Act of 2019 (hereinafter, the “HSTPA”) finding the retroactive applicability of the statute to be
constitutional and not a violation of petitioner’s due process rights. Subsequently, the First
Department decided Harris v. Israel, - NYS3d -, 2021 N.Y. Slip Op. 796 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021)(1st
Dept 2021) which barred retroactive application of Part I (L 2019, ch 36, § 2), Rent Stabilization
Law of 1969 [Administrative Code of City of NY] § 26-511(c)(9)(b). Petitioner asks this Court to
vacate its prior dismissal of the proceedings and restore them to the calendar for trial asserting that
there has been “a change in the law that would change the prior determination.” CPLR Rule
2221(e). Respondent opposes the motion. The reader of this decision/order is presumed to be
familiar with the facts of this case and the prior order is incorporated herein by reference.
A motion to renew is based upon new facts not offered on the prior motion that would
change the prior determination or shall demonstrate that there has been a change in the law that
would change the prior determination. Foley v. Roach, 86 AD2d 887 (2nd Dept 1982). Furthermore,
the doctrine of stare decisis requires trial courts in this department to follow precedents set by the
Appellate Divisions of another department until the Court of Appeals or this department
pronounces a contrary rule. Mountain View Coach v. Storms, 102 AD2d 663 (2nd Dept 1984). This
rule does not pertain if the legal question addressed is one of first impression or not expressly
decided by the higher court. In such circumstances, the concerns of uniformity and consistency do
not present themselves. Mountain View Coach v. Storms, supra.
2
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HARRIS V. ISRAEL
The Harris proceeding was commenced in September 2016 when the owner sought to
recover the apartment for personal use. A possessory judgment was issued in the owner’s favor
in July 2018 and a warrant of eviction was issued in August 2018 but was stayed pending an
appeal to the Appellate Term. Applying Part I of the HSTPA which took effect in June 2019, the
Appellate Term reversed and remanded the proceeding in December 2019. Following Regina
Metropolitan Co., LLC v. New York State Div. Of Hous. And Comm. Renewal, 35 NY3d 332
(2020), the First Department reversed the Appellate Term holding that Part I of the HSTPA had
been applied retroactively and that such application violated due process:
However, four months after Appellate Term issued its decision in this proceeding,
the Court of Appeals decided Matter of Regina Metro. Co., LLC v New York
State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal (35 NY3d 332 [2020]), holding that
HSTPA Part F, relating to rent overcharges, could not be applied to pending cases
because "application of these amendments to past conduct would not comport
with our retroactivity jurisprudence or the requirements of due process" (id. at
349).
We conclude that the same reasoning applies with equal measure to HSTPA Part
I. Like the amendment in Regina Metro, this amendment "impair[s] rights owners
possessed in the past, increasing their liability for past conduct and imposing new
duties with respect to transactions already completed" (id. at 369). Therefore, a
presumption against retroactivity applies (id. at 370). The pre-Regina Metro cases
notwithstanding, the determination of the Court of Appeals that an owner's
increased liability and the disruption of relied-upon repose are impairments to his
or her substantive rights precludes any retroactive application of HSTPA Part I to
this proceeding, where petitioner had spent several years reclaiming all other units
at the property and was ultimately awarded a judgment of possession to the
premises before HSTPA's enactment (id. at 379). "[T]here is no indication here
that the legislature considered th[is] harsh and destabilizing effect on [petitioner's]
settled expectations, much less had a rational justification for that result" (id. at
383).
The First Department limited its decision to the specific “proceeding” before it and
explained the factual basis for its determination: “where petitioner had spent several years
reclaiming all other units at the property and was ultimately awarded a judgment of
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possession...before HSTPA’s enactment.” Clearly, the pre-HSTPA possessory judgment was
central to the First Department’s due process analysis.
Similarly in the Regina decision, the Court of Appeals cited two personal use cases in
which a newly enacted statute was applied on appeal despite a judgment of possession and
certificate of eviction having already been issued. See Matter of McMurray v. New York State of
Div of Hous. & Community Renewal, 72 NY2d 1022 (1988); Matter of Cirella v. Joy, 69 NY2d
973 (1987). Thus, the Court of Appeals’ due process analysis was directly informed by the fact
that the landlord’s right to possession had been granted to only be stripped away by application
of the newly enacted statute. Relying on the Regina decision, the First Department adopted the
factual underpinning of the Court of Appeals’ due process analysis. Thus, its citation of the postjudgment posture of the proceeding before it was not merely dicta. In a summary proceeding,
the judgment of possession is the central relief sought as it annuls the relationship of landlord
and tenant. The judgment of possession fixed the rights and obligations of all parties to the
proceeding. As noted by the Harris court, vacating the judgment of possession after the
enactment of the HSTPA destabilized petitioner’s “settled expectations.”
As persuasively argued by respondents, there are two possible readings of the Harris
decision. First, Part I of the statute operated retroactively because of the owner’s pre-HSTPA
judgment and, in such post-judgment cases, retroactive application does not comport with due
process. Second, Part I of the statute operates retroactively when applied to any pending case,
whether pre- or post-judgment, and such application does not comport with due process. The
briefs of the parties to Harris supports the first interpretation.
Petitioner-owner in Harris argued that “[o]riginally, the trial court vindicated PetitionerAppellant’s then-existing right to repossess his real property for personal use, culminating in the
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issuance of a warrant of eviction against respondent.” See Brief For Petitioner-LandlordAppellant at p.13-14. The owner noted that the effective date provisions of the HSTPA did not
expressly restore a landlord-tenant relationship “where said relationship had been severed prior
to the law’s enactment.” Again, the owner directly connected his successful appellate argument
to the existence of a judgment of possession, the annulling of the landlord/tenant relationship by
issuance of a warrant, and the expectations and rights created by these facts.
The petitioner-owner in Harris went on to suggest an interpretation of the Legislature’s
intent that would comport with constitutional due process: the statute “would apply Part I to all
occupants who, at the time the law was enacted, either (1) had a lease in effect, or (2) were
otherwise not subject to a warrant of eviction.” See Reply Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at p 910. Ultimately, the Harris Court did not explicitly adopt this view of legislative intent but did
rule that retroactive application of the HSTPA “impair[s] rights owners possessed in the past,
increasing their liability for past conduct and imposing new duties with respect to transactions
already completed." The right before the Harris court was the petitioner-owner’s right to
repossess the property for personal use based on the judgment of possession entered by the court
prior to the enactment of the HSTPA. The new duties were clearly the reinstatement of the
landlord/tenant relationship and concomitant rent regulated contract.

THE INSTANT PROCEEDING
The facts of the instant proceeding are distinguishable from those in Harris. Here,
petitioner has not obtained a judgment of possession. Thus, his rights have not been adjudicated
and fixed by the courts. The landlord/tenant relationship is intact until the court affirms
petitioner’s right not to renew the rent regulated lease. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the
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pre-judgment posture of this proceeding is more than “a distinction without a difference.” As
noted earlier, the judgment of possession is the central relief sought in this summary proceeding.
The application of a new statute to a pending case is not automatically retroactive.
Regina, supra, at 365-67. “A statute does not operate retroactively merely because it is applied
in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute’s enactment, or upsets expectations based in
prior law. Langraf v. USI Film Products, 511 US 244 (1994). A new statute’s application in a
pending case is retroactive only when it “takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under
existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty....” Langraf, supra. “If, on the
other hand, it “affects only ‘the propriety of prospective relief’ or the nonsubstantive provisions
governing the procedure for adjudication of a claim, the new statute operates prospectively.
Regina, supra, at 365 quoting Landgraf, 511 US at 273.
Looking back at Harris, the First Department concluded that application of Part I
operated retroactively in that proceeding as it increased the owner’s liability for past conduct and
imposed new duties as previously discussed. The due process violation was directly rooted in
the issuance of the judgment of possession and its vacatur by the courts. In the instant
proceeding, a judgment of possession has not issued. The rights of the parties have not been
determined. Applying the HSTPA to this pre-judgment proceeding does not take away or impair
the vested rights of petitioner herein. Petitioner does not “...have in any particular rule an interest
so vested as to entitle it to keep the rule unchanged.” I.L.F.Y. Co. v. Temporary State Hous. Rent
Commn., 10 NY2d 263 1961 at p 270. This Court’s interpretation of the Harris decision draws a
sensible line from the pre-Regina jurisprudence to the application of Part I of the newly enacted
HSTPA.
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This Court holds that the Harris decision is not a change in law for pre-judgment
proceedings and is distinguishable from the instant case. As a question of first impression for the
Second Department, the Court hereby denies the renewal motion and adheres to its prior decision
and order.

Dated: June 10, 2021
Brooklyn, NY

_______________________
Kevin C. McClanahan, J.H.C
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